The lifetime cost of purchasing, owning and operating the Air Force’s troubled CH-148 Cyclones is now expected to exceed $14.87 billion, according to a leaked internal Pentagon briefing document obtained by CBC News. .
Most of the cost ($10 billion) is for aircraft maintenance. The CH-148 Cyclone is unique. No other country flies maritime helicopters.
The estimates were included in a spreadsheet in a submission sent to the federal Treasury Committee at the end of 2021 when the Department of Defense (DND) was seeking an additional $111 million to replenish the program’s budget. ing. The increase was ultimately approved.
The last numbers published on the DND and Federal Acquisition Services websites estimate the total cost of the program to be more than $9 billion.
The newly revised figures represent the cost of acquiring aircraft (currently estimated at $3.7 billion) and the cost of maintaining and operating helicopters (currently estimated at $11.17 billion) through the late 2030s.
The federal government already has an estimated $5.8 billion in in-service support contracts with manufacturers, which accounts for a portion of the $10 billion figure cited in the sustainability briefing.
It’s not clear what caused the difference between the $5.8 billion estimate and the $10 billion figure in the explanatory document, but experts say Canada’s tendency to fly aircraft well beyond their useful lives means that Canada will be able to fly planes well beyond their useful lives, leading to a decline in the It has been suggested that this may be for the support of
DND blamed recent cost increases on “inflationary pressures” and insisted it was not paying a premium for spare parts.
The Air Force is still waiting for the last two aircraft to be delivered.
Despite the Cyclone acquisition being planned 20 years ago, the Air Force has yet to receive the final two of the 28 helicopters on its original order. DND announced late Thursday that it expects to receive its penultimate helicopter at the end of next month and the last aircraft in 2025.
A 65-page briefing document prepared in 2021 shows defense officials knew at the time that completing the final two aircraft would be problematic.
“There is a significant risk that the supplier may not be able to complete the final two aircraft and as a result, DND/CAF may need to consider accepting them in a reduced configuration,” the briefing document said. It is stated in. A percentage of the components needed to complete the helicopter must be sourced from the manufacturer, Sikorsky.
The briefing said it was “unlikely” that contractors would not be able to find the parts needed, and emphasized how important maritime helicopters are to naval operations now and in the future.
DND declined CBC News’ request for comment from the commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force and other senior officials who could explain the decision and a number of other issues highlighted in the candid assessment.
Instead, it issued a written statement.
Radar warning system was not deployed
Among the main concerns mentioned in the briefing document was the fact that the federal government paid $41.8 million for the radar warning system, which was included in the original contract cost. DND said in a statement that the manufacturer had agreed to “provide other materials for the project at a discounted price.”
Under the terms of the contract, Sikorsky was supposed to provide radar warning equipment, but was unable to do so due to U.S. government technology transfer restrictions. This equipment had to be purchased separately from defense giant Lockheed Martin, which currently owns Sikorsky.
A leaked internal report warns that the Canadian Armed Forces’ Cyclone helicopter’s weapons systems are becoming obsolete, even as the military awaits delivery from the manufacturer of the last two helicopters. , it has been almost 20 years since it was first procured.
The report also calls for modifying the flight software, modifying the frigate’s flight deck and adding special shipboard lighting and filters to prevent pilots wearing night vision from being blinded during takeoff and landing. He pointed out that more funds were needed.
“I was surprised that [the software fixes and additional equipment] In this case, it appears to have been moved outside of the ship modification package,” said retired Col. Larry McFah, an aviation specialist who commanded the 423rd Squadron when it flew the CH-124 Sea King.
“I thought that was part of it and should have been paid as part of the original proposal and contract.”
Makufa said he had long warned that the Cyclone would be expensive to maintain, but was still surprised by the numbers at the press conference.
“They’re adding as much spin as they can.”
“The 65-page report is pretty comprehensive, and it clearly shows that they were well aware that things weren’t going well,” he said.
“They are trying, because this is part of the submission to the Treasury Committee. ” [Treasury] I don’t get the impression that the board is just putting money into a black hole. ”
In explaining the background of the program, an internal briefing placed almost all of the blame for the delay at Sikorsky’s feet.
“When Sikorsky won, [maritime helicopter program] “As the contract was awarded in 2004, the company had limited experience with the scope and depth of in-service support required by Canada, and had limited knowledge of Canada’s airworthiness systems,” the briefing said. Are listed.
“Sikorsky incorrectly assumed that the high level of commonality between the CH148 and the civilian-certified S-92 would be maintained as key to mitigating schedule risk. , significantly underestimated the number of design efforts and tests that S-92A meets Canada’s requirements. ”
The document also complained about the company’s decision to “introduce an electronic flight control system (EFCS), known as fly-by-wire,” which resulted in a gradual redesign of the airframe, mechanical components, and electrical components. ing.
Another defense expert said he was surprised to read that part of the briefing.
“Is the Canadian government responsible for how this went wrong?” asked Dave Perry, director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, a procurement expert who has been tracking the program.
“I don’t think it’s plausible that the Canadian government can’t give credit for anything it could have done better. That’s how I interpret it.”
Sikorsky officials responded Thursday night and said they are working diligently to complete the last aircraft and bring the fleet to full capacity.
“Sikorsky and our major subcontractor, the Royal Canadian Air Force, collaborated on the design, development, testing, delivery and sustainment of the CH-148 maritime helicopter fleet,” said Melissa Chadwick, a spokeswoman for Lockheed Martin, Sikorsky’s parent company. Stated. Media statement.
“As a team, we are working to overcome the technical challenges that remain to meet Canada’s unique requirements. Sikorsky will continue to support the CH-148 helicopter fleet to meet Canada’s maritime operational needs. ”