“For me, I think there is a practical answer to this: an agreement between governments that ensures effective security protection and transparency around hardware, model weight and know-how. This is what I have been working on. [memorandum of understanding] I believe this is a sustainable model for building strong technology partnerships there and with other countries. This provides the United States with a series of economic and strategic advantages. We don’t want to enter China’s technology trajectory. ”
On the types of trade agreements Asian countries want:
“In my view, what countries are looking for is becoming increasingly bespoke. It’s not just about broad market access; it’s the specific needs of countries that are thinking about their future economic models. So the economic dialogue that we’ve had with these countries about the attractiveness of the United States is not just, “Can we lower the barriers to market access?” ”
“So let me give you a few examples: With Japan, we really wanted an MOU on critical minerals to secure a route to benefit from the IRA. [Inflation Reduction Act]. That was kind of their biggest wish, and it was much more important to them than a broader trade deal. In Indonesia, it’s very similar. That’s what Indonesia wants. Essentially, they want to finalize high-level critical minerals agreements so that Indonesian nickel can flow to other countries for things like U.S. electric vehicle manufacturing and batteries. ”
On whether U.S. workers and industry benefited from early free trade agreements:
“So where do workers fit in? Well, I would say workers fit in there. They’re going to get lower-cost goods, and that’s good for them, to some extent. I’m not against free trade because it’s the right thing to do. But it has to include an element of theory about how America’s industrial base, our ability to build here, is preserved. That’s why I actually think about things like IRAs. [Inflation Reduction Act] And a critical minerals agreement with Japan is a more rational way to think about free trade going forward. ”
What Sullivan learned from his meetings with Xi and Wang:
“The most memorable thing for me was what came out of the meeting with President Xi, which was very emphasized in the meeting between President Biden and President Xi, and also in the meeting with Wang Yi, but intermittently. But this is my view, China’s view when we came into power was, “If you’re going to compete with us, we’re not going to cooperate, and we have no means of communication.” “I don’t even have one,” he said. You can’t have it both ways. You have to choose. And we have stuck to the theory of managed competition. We’re going to compete, we’re going to compete vigorously, but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t find areas of cooperation in our fields. It’s also profitable. And to compete responsibly, we need to communicate at all levels, including maintaining inter-military communications. ”
“When we leave, China will [People’s Republic of China] At least for the time being, we are adopting managed competition, not in the way we talk, but in the way we conduct our relationships. We have identified areas for cooperation, including counter-drugs, AI, nuclear risk and climate. We maintain communications, including military-to-military communications, and although we compete and obviously compete intensely, there is still an element of stability in the relationship and we are not currently on the brink of a downward spiral. plug. This is a significant four-year evolution in how bilateral relations are managed, and is consistent with the theory of relationship management that China currently reflects. ”
